

### **Błażej Popławski:<sup>1</sup> How to assess states' vulnerability and the emergence of terrorism in Africa? A comparative analysis of the Fragile States Index and the Composite Index of National Capability<sup>2</sup>**

#### **Executive summary**

- Recent studies have undertaken empirical tests of the relationship between poverty and state failure as predictors of terrorism.
- There are many types of statistical methods for measuring vulnerability of states, such as the Fragile States Index (FSI) and the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC).
- Africa is the continent with the highest number of existing fragile or failed states. According to FSI, two thirds of the 50 states with the highest degree of dysfunctionality are African countries.
- Contrary to a commonly held view, prime international terrorists do not come from failed states, nor do failed states house many organizations that support terrorism. The FSI seems to be a more valuable measure of the relation between states' vulnerability and the emergence of terrorism in Africa with some restrictions.
- For those countries that have high scores in the CINC, terrorism appears in the picture as an external problem, and for the countries that score high on the FSI, terrorism is rather an internal challenge.
- The position in the CINC ranking does not simply correlate with the level of internal security, CINC can also be used to select countries that are responsible for strengthening security on the local level and to participate in the global war on terror and to test the fighting capability of the countries which became targets of terrorist attacks.

**The aim of this analysis is to identify ways to assess states' vulnerability and the correlation of certain vulnerabilities and the emergence of terrorism in Africa. Recent studies have undertaken some empirical tests on the relationship between poverty, globalization and state failure as predictors of terrorism. The hypothesis of this article assumes that there is correlation between the degrees of disintegration and dysfunctionality of the state and the activity of terrorist organizations in the given country, subject to our analysis.**

#### **Introduction**

There are many types of statistical methods for measuring the vulnerability of states. Most indicators were created during – or just after – the Cold War by Western scientists. Their attempts to measure states' power were based on the national capacities approach, which reflected the realist vision of the world order that predominated at the time.<sup>3</sup> In general, these indicators can be divided into two types. The first one concentrates on the analysis of the success of states (mostly from the Euro-Atlantic region). The second one studies the reasons of failure in the Second (under the Soviet sphere of influence) and the Third (post-colonial) World. These methodological differences very often lead to surprising conclusions.

'Is the glass half empty or half full?' This common expression is used rhetorically to

<sup>1</sup> Błażej Popławski (blazej@afrykanista.pl) is a historian (MSc, Ph.D., University of Warsaw) and sociologist (MSc, University of Warsaw), member of the Polish Africanist Society.

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<sup>3</sup> OLIVIÉ, I. – GRAICA, M. – GARCÍA-CALVO, C.: *Elcano Global Presence Report 2014*. Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 2014, 1.



indicate that a particular situation could be perceived from two, contradicting perspectives. When we focus on the terms and conditions of achieving success by a state, very often we do not identify many negative political phenomena. From the other side, when we outline the causes of state collapse, we can ignore the socio-cultural context of the process and disregard the opportunity costs.

The aim of the article is to identify ways to assess states' vulnerability and the correlation of certain vulnerabilities and the emergence of terrorism in Africa. Recent studies have undertaken some empirical tests of the relationship between poverty, globalization and state failure as predictors of terrorism<sup>4</sup>. The preliminary hypothesis of this article assumes that there is correlation between the degrees of disintegration and dysfunctionality of the state and the activity of terrorist organizations.

Two indicators had been chosen for the analysis: the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) and the Fragile States Index (FSI). The first one is centred upon the motives of attaining power, the second reckons states' vulnerability to conflict or collapse. The second hypothesis of the article was formulated against this background: for the countries which have high scores in the CINC, terrorism appears as an external problem, and for countries, which are at the top of the FSI, that means the worst cases of state failures, terrorism is rather an internal challenge.

### The Composite Index of National Capability

The Composite Index of National Capability is a statistical measure of national power. It was created during the Cold War by American political scientist J. David Singer – and continued by Stuart Bremer (1998-2002), D. Scott Bennett (2002-2004), Paul F. Diehl (2005-2012) and Zeev Maoz (since 2013) – for the Correlates of War project.<sup>5</sup> This programme, which started in 1963, involves assembling a cross-national and chronological data set on the incidence and extent of inter-state and extra-systemic war in the post-Napoleonic period.<sup>6</sup>

CINC measures three different categories of power: economic, demographic and military. More specifically, CINC specifies national shares in six indicators: total population of country ratio (TPR); urban population of country ratio (UPR); iron and steel production of country ratio (ISPR); primary energy consumption ratio (ECR), military expenditure ratio (MER); and military personnel ratio (MPR).<sup>7</sup> The indicator illustrates a state's share of the system total of each indicator of capabilities in each year, weighting each component equally. The CINC score is always ranged between 0 and 1. A state possessing all power in the international system would receive a CINC score of 1, whereas a state with absolutely no power in any dimension would receive 0.<sup>8</sup>

Table 1 presents a list of selected countries by CINC. Two parts of the table are highlighted: the first one (Ranks 1-10) includes countries, which are the strongest in demographic, economic, and military aspects; the second one includes the weakest states (Ranks 184-193). African countries are listed in-between these two groups. The highest-ranking Sub-Saharan countries are Nigeria, South Africa, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, and Angola. The lowest ranks are filled by Small

<sup>4</sup> PIAZZA, J. A.: Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism? *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 52. 2008, 469-488; PIAZZA, J. A.: Rooted in Poverty? Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social Cleavages. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 18. 2006, 159-177.

<sup>5</sup> SINGER, J. D.: *The Correlates of War. Testing some Realpolitik Models*. The Free Press, New York, 1980.

<sup>6</sup> SUŁEK, M.: *Potęga państw. Modele i zastosowania*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Rambler, 2013, 112-113.

<sup>7</sup> SINGER, J. D. – BREMER, S. – STUCKEY, J.: *Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965*. In RUSSETT, B. (ed.): *Peace, War, and Numbers*. Sage, Beverly Hills, 1972, 19-48; SINGER, J. D.: *Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816-1985*. *International Interactions*, Vol. 14. 1987, 115-132.

<sup>8</sup> BIDDLE, S.: *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle*. Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2004, 21.

Island Developing States (IDS): Mauritius, Comoros, Cape Verde, Seychelles, as well as tiny countries from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (Gambia, Liberia) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (Swaziland).

Rank	Country	CINC	Rank	Country	CINC	Rank	Country	CINC
1	China	.198578	83	Ivory Coast	.001173	143	Central African Republic (CAR)	.000206
2	United States	.142149	84	Ghana	.001109	147	Botswana	.000187
3	India	.073444	87	Zimbabwe	.001032	148	Namibia	.000179
4	Japan	.042675	88	Mozambique	.000994	149	Gabon	.000153
5	Russia	.039274	90	Cameroon	.000969	151	Djibouti	.000145
6	Brazil	.024597	94	Tunisia	.000822	153	Guinea-Bissau	.000132
7	Germany	.024082	97	Zambia	.000749	155	Equatorial Guinea	.000109
8	South Korea	.023878	98	Madagascar	.000711	156	Lesotho	.000098
9	United Kingdom	.021158	100	Burkina Faso	.000659	158	Mauritius	.000062
10	France	.018924	101	Senegal	.000645	160	Swaziland	.000057
22	Egypt	.009713	104	Rwanda	.000581	161	Gambia	.000051
26	Nigeria	.007792	107	Chad	.000568	168	Comoros	.000024
31	South Africa	.006316	108	Burundi	.000562	169	Cape Verde	.000022
35	Algeria	.005290	110	Somalia	.000531	177	Seychelles	.000004
39	Morocco	.004471	111	Malawi	.000527	184	Tonga	.000003
42	Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)	.004175	112	Mali	.000516	185	Andorra	.000003
43	Ethiopia	.003895	113	Niger	.000505	186	Kiribati	.000002
50	Sudan	.003107	117	Guinea	.000458	187	Dominica	.000002
56	Angola	.002557	123	Sierra Leone	.000393	188	Liechtenstein	.000002
60	Eritrea	.002157	126	Benin	.000370	189	Saint Kitts and Nevis	.000002
62	Tanzania	.002078	127	Congo	.000361	190	Marshall Islands	.000001
65	Kenya	.001777	134	Togo	.000297	191	Palau	.000001
66	Libya	.001763	135	Mauritania	.000290	192	Nauru	.000000
80	Uganda	.001320	142	Liberia	.000223	193	Tuvalu	.000000

Table 1: Countries listed by CINC score. (Source: The Correlates of War Database. Available at: <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/>, retrieved on 10 09 2017)



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We should agree with Robert Stewart-Ingersoll and Derrick Frazier who wrote: ‘The CPI<sup>9</sup> is meant to represent those capabilities that allow states to influence others within the context of an industrialized system and are quite common measure used in the determination of system polarity.’<sup>10</sup> According to these authors, CINC became popular half a century ago. The design of CINC is clearly associated with the political mentality of the times of war.<sup>11</sup> It was developed in the Cold War, when the use of such military inputs would have been logical due to the arms race between two blocks, and also due to the memories of the world wars.

Now, many scientists are much more sceptical about the efficacy of these kinds of indicators to outline the problems of security in the era of globalization. For example, CINC ignores human capital qualifications (semi-quantifiable), and the overall quality of production (at best very difficult to quantify but GDP per capita would be a decent proxy). It marginalizes the purpose of different social and militant actors – as Cullen S. Hendrix, Joseph K. Young wrote: ‘the CINC aims to capture relative power differentials between sovereign states, whereas absolute military capacity should matter more to dissidents. In short, it seems unlikely that a dissident in El Salvador is more or less likely to use terrorism because Sweden’s military capacity increased vis-a-vis El Salvador. This hypothetical militant is more likely concerned with the capabilities possessed by the El Salvadoran security apparatus.’<sup>12</sup>

The CINC cannot be used for comparisons across time either (as Bear F. Braumoeller suggested: ‘a country with 10 percent of the world’s military capacity in 2016 is vastly more powerful than a country with 10 percent of the world’s military capacity in 1815.’<sup>13</sup>) Although CINC would be useful for historical analysis and often can help to explain the outcome and duration of conventional conflicts between states, it is necessary to point out that the indicator can significantly overstate the capabilities of countries that dominate any one dimension (for instance China’s immense population in the 20<sup>th</sup> century). Robert J. Carroll and Brenton Kenkel wrote: ‘CINC ratios are inappropriate as a proxy for expected dispute outcomes for a variety of reasons, including problems with the CINC function itself, ad hoc parameterizations, and issues of functional form.’<sup>14</sup>

Therefore, we can find room for some modification of CINC. Table 2 shows the CINC scores from the most powerful countries at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century after adjustment has been made for purchasing-power parity.

This perspective – using CINC as a ‘sub-tool’ of a broader investigation – is more reasonable.<sup>15</sup> We can compare the potential of different states (of course not only in the economic aspects<sup>16</sup>) and try to find answers why a country is more susceptible to the process of disintegration than another.<sup>17</sup> The utility of CINC in the characterisation of the correlation between the degrees of dysfunctionality of the

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<sup>9</sup> Consumer Price Index

<sup>10</sup> STEWART-INGGERSOLL, R. – FRANZIER, D.: *Regional Powers and Security Orders: A Theoretical Framework*. London and New York: Routledge, 2012, 55.

<sup>11</sup> RUSSETT, B. – STARR, H. – KINSELLA, D.: *World Politics: The Menu for Choice*. Ninth Edition. Wadsworth: Cengage Learning, 2010, 118.

<sup>12</sup> HENDRIX, C. S. – YOUNG, J. K.: State Capacity and Terrorism: A Two-Dimensional Approach. *Security Studies* 23. 2014, 342.

<sup>13</sup> BRAUMOELLER, B. F.: *Has the American military fallen behind?*, [online], 04 05 2016, Source: *Washingtonpost*. [10 08 2017]

<sup>14</sup> CARROLL, R. J. – KENKEL, B.: *Capability Ratios Predict Nothing*, [online], 21 07 2015, Source: *Rochester.edu*. [13 09 2017]

<sup>15</sup> SUŁEK, M.: *Prognozowanie i symulacje międzynarodowe*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, 2010, 113.

<sup>16</sup> MEIERRIEKS, D. – GRIES, T.: Causality between terrorism and economic growth. *Journal of Peace Research* 50/1. 2013, 93.

<sup>17</sup> TYHUSKA, A.: The Concept of International Role in International Relations Theory and Practice: The “PIPP” Analytical Model and Roles Actors Play in World Politics. *Athenaeum. Polish Political Science Studies* 52. 2016, 27-53.

state and the activity of terrorist organizations looks disappointing. The cases of Nigeria (24<sup>th</sup> position in the ranking) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (42<sup>nd</sup> position) are significant. These two large countries with abundant human and natural resources are far from political stability. In Nigeria there are many terrorist and insurgent groups: Boko Haram, Ansaru (Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan – Vanguard for the protection of Muslims in Black Africa), Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), etc. Two Islamist organizations from Nigeria – Boko Haram and Ansaru – have been added to the U.S. State Department’s list of foreign terrorist organizations for killing thousands of people and threatening Westerners in West Africa. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, there are even more armed groups than in Nigeria: Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), Mai-Mai, National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), Patriotic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (FPLC), Allied Democratic Forces / National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF/NALU), Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), Front for Patriotic Resistance in Ituri / Popular Front for Justice in Congo (FRPI/FPJC), Enyele / Independent Movement of Liberation and Allies (MILIA), etc.

Year	U.S.	China	Japan	India	Germany	U.K.	France	Italy	Brazil	Russia
1860	0,077	0,174	0,025	-	0,052	0,276	0,122	0,029	0,008	0,089
1880	0,125	0,163	0,021	-	0,106	0,218	0,108	0,032	0,009	0,104
1900	0,188	0,120	0,029	-	0,132	0,178	0,075	0,028	0,009	0,109
1946	0,364	0,133	-	-	-	0,116	0,031	0,018	0,013	0,123
1951	0,320	0,104	-	0,050	-	0,059	0,033	0,018	0,012	0,173
1956	0,261	0,098	0,032	0,045	0,038	0,049	0,033	0,018	0,011	0,170
1961	0,211	0,105	0,039	0,049	0,041	0,040	0,030	0,020	0,013	0,174
1966	0,209	0,110	0,043	0,052	0,037	0,035	0,026	0,021	0,015	0,167
1971	0,171	0,112	0,054	0,053	0,034	0,028	0,024	0,021	0,018	0,172
1976	0,0143	0,116	0,055	0,054	0,033	0,027	0,024	0,020	0,020	0,176
1981	0,139	0,118	0,051	0,052	0,029	0,025	0,022	0,019	0,023	0,169
1986	0,137	0,111	0,049	0,057	0,026	0,023	0,018	0,017	0,026	0,174
1991	0,137	0,114	0,053	0,062	0,030	0,026	0,021	0,019	0,024	0,102
1996	0,143	0,126	0,052	0,067	0,030	0,025	0,023	0,019	0,027	0,059
2001	0,150	0,134	0,051	0,068	0,028	0,023	0,020	0,018	0,025	0,055

Table 2: The Composite Index of National Capability. (Source: CHAN, Steve: *China, U.S., and the Power-Transition Theory. A Critique*. London-New York: Routledge, 2008, 12.)

Meanwhile, there are no significant security threats in the SIDS (positioned in the CINC at 158<sup>th</sup>, 168<sup>th</sup>, 169<sup>th</sup> and 177<sup>th</sup>), Swaziland (160<sup>th</sup>) or Gambia (161<sup>th</sup>). However, if we look at the list of countries according to the CINC, it is easy to see that there are countries strongly involved in the war on terror and UN peacekeeping operations<sup>18</sup> among the countries with the highest scores. This is an important conclusion for further analysis.

CINC, as described above, was constructed as an instrument to study the distribution of power in the international system and to make forecasts for a hypothetical war. After the end of the Cold War, CINC can be used at least in two manners: 1) to select countries which are responsible for providing security on the local level and to participate in the global war on terror,<sup>19</sup> and 2) to test the fighting

<sup>18</sup> Troop and police contributors, [online], 2017, Source: *Un.org* [10 02 2017]

<sup>19</sup> See the analysis of the relations of power capability of countries during the intervention in Afghanistan: WEITSMAN, P.: *Waging War: Alliances, Coalitions, and Institutions of Interstate Violence*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014, 119-121.

capability of the countries which became targets of terrorist attacks.<sup>20</sup> In fact, finding a comprehensive and effective solution to the challenges of terrorism requires some understanding of how to restore failed states.<sup>21</sup>

### The Fragile States Index

Failed states have been a crucial part of the global debate since the end of the Cold War. One of the most popular indicators for the degree of a state's collapse is the Fragile States Index (FSI; formerly the Failed States Index). The FSI was established in 2005 by the analysts of Foreign Policy, a periodical founded in 1970 by Samuel Huntington and Warren Manshel, and the representatives of Fund for Peace, a non-governmental organization based in Washington.<sup>22</sup>

At the beginning the FSI included 41 indicators grouped into 12 categories, including pressures deriving from high population density; history of aggrieved communal groups based on recent or past injustices; 'brain drain'; institutionalised political exclusion; a drop in GNP; the appearance of private militias or guerrillas; increased corruption; higher poverty rates for some ethnic groups; human rights violations; fragmentation of ruling elites based on group lines.<sup>23</sup>

A decade after its establishment, the number of indicators in the Index varied. The authors of the successive reports suggest that this was influenced by the dynamics of geopolitical relations in the era of globalisation. This statement, a typical example of political science empty talk, conceals the conviction that the growing importance of the countries of the South in the international arena constrains an adjustment of the indicators of the conditions in these countries. Initially, the FSI was based on the analysis of uneven development, the legitimacy of state authority and the risks associated with demographic trends. Over time, the list was extended to include the degree of control over the territory of the state, the level of internal security, access to basic social services and the existence – understood in the Weberian sense – of a state monopoly on the use of force. Another change was related to recognising the role of corruption, seizure of power by the elites, ethno-religious divisions and shortcomings in the rule of law. At the end of the first decade of this century, the list was extended to include an evaluation of the instruments of crisis management as well. Currently, the index is based on an evaluation of 12 indicators grouped in four areas.

Cohesion	Economic	Political	Social
Security Apparatus	Economic Decline	State Legitimacy	Demographic Pressures
Factionalized Elites	Uneven Economic Development	Public Services	Refugees and IDPs
Group Grievance	Human Flight and Brain Drain	Human Rights and Rule of Law	External Intervention

Table 3: The FSI Indicators. (Source: The author's elaboration based on annual FSI reports. Available at: <http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/>, retrieved on 10 09 2017.

In 2014, the name of the index had been changed: the term 'failed' was replaced with 'fragile', which in this context means 'unsteady', 'weak' or – according to some political scientists – 'pre-

<sup>20</sup> ABRAHMS, M.: The Political Effectiveness of Terrorism Revisited. *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 45. No. 3. 2012, 373.

<sup>21</sup> YOO, J.: Fixing Failed States. *California Law Review* Vol. 99, No. 1. 2011, 95.

<sup>22</sup> CALL, C. T.: The Fallacy of the 'Failed State'. *Third World Quarterly* Vol. 29. No. 8. 2008, 1495.

<sup>23</sup> MARX, J.: Failed-State Fiction. *Contemporary Literature* Vol. 49. No. 4. 2008, 600.



dysfunctional’.<sup>24</sup> This statement may conceal the belief that the term ‘failed’ has acquired an overly pejorative connotation, both in the eyes of politicians and the public, and thus, it has ceased to be useful in the scientific description of reality, thereby dismissing the chances for understanding and for constructive discussions. ‘Failed’ and ‘collapsed’ were becoming less and less meaningful, and these terms gradually started causing annoyance, whereas for some politicians and the public, especially those from the ‘fragile states’, they were insulting or at least politically incorrect.<sup>25</sup> Olivier Nay noticed: ‘It does not distinguish what differentiates the »fragile state« concept from other concepts previously used to describe underdevelopment and extreme poverty – such as »least developed countries«, »countries under stress« and »low-income countries«.’<sup>26</sup>

In Table 4 – at the end of this paper –, a list of selected countries by the FSI is presented. It displays 30 of the most dysfunctional states according to the FSI reports from the last decade. Three parts of the table are highlighted in compliance with the selected categories labelled by the authors of the index: ‘very high alert’ (from South Sudan to Sudan and Syria), ‘high alert’ (from the DRC to Ethiopia), and ‘alert’ (from Guinea Bissau to North Korea).

The results of the subsequent FSIs do not leave any doubt: Africa is the continent with the highest number of existing fragile or failed states. This crisis is present to the greatest extent to the south of the Sahara, especially in Central Africa, the eastern part of the Sahel, and the Horn of Africa. The most fragile states of the world are South Sudan (also the youngest state in the world), Somalia, the Central African Republic, Yemen and Syria. Other states among the top 20 often include the DRC, Chad, Guinea, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Guinea Bissau, Burundi, Eritrea and Niger. Of the 50 states with the highest degree of dysfunctionality, two thirds are African states.

What determines such a ranking for the African states in the FSI? In short, the post-colonial heritage, the condition of modern political elites and, what should be emphasized, the growing terrorist threat.<sup>27</sup> African states – speaking *en bloc* – are characterized by the lowest level of economic development and education, and the highest rate of poverty in the world, as well as vehement tribalism, which – according to Robert Kłosowicz, a specialist in dysfunctional states – leads to atrophy of state institutions and the world’s largest number of armed conflicts.<sup>28</sup> It is necessary to include the socio-political reasons on this list: the lack of professionalization of elites, the de-legitimization of state authority, the corruption and cronyism devastating the public sphere, the slow emergence of a middle class, the lack of an institutional base of civil society and the difficulties with development of the identification of the state. Demography also plays an important role: a progressive age structure, very high population growth, the lowest life expectancy, the highest mortality rate and the largest number of people infected with HIV. It is frequently overlooked that the lack of demographic balance, marginalised in the short term, often has a direct effect on the long-term political stability of countries.

These political, social, and cultural phenomena are important when we study the connection between state failure and global security threats, especially after 9/11.<sup>29</sup> Among the countries ranked

<sup>24</sup> POPLAWSKI, B.: [Failed States Index – państwa kruche czy upadłe?](#), [online], 09 07 2014, Source: *Kultura Liberalna* [04 08 2017].

<sup>25</sup> At the same time, it can be argued that the term *failed* was exaggerated, since many countries that were in the end of the list a few years ago, such as Sierra Leone, have recently shown a strong increase in GDP (which rarely translates, however, to a reduction of economic stratification).

<sup>26</sup> NAY, O.: Fragile and failed states: Critical perspectives on conceptual hybrids. *International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique* Vol. 34. No. 3. 2013, 332.

<sup>27</sup> EHRENREICH BROOKS, R.: Failed States, or the State as Failure? *The University of Chicago Law Review* Vol. 72. No. 4. 2005, 1162.

<sup>28</sup> KŁOSOWICZ, R.: Państwa dysfunkcyjne w Afryce Subsaharyjskiej. In KŁOSOWICZ, R. (ed.): *Państwa dysfunkcyjne i międzynarodowe wysiłki zmierzające do ich naprawy*. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków, 2014, 14.

<sup>29</sup> ROTBERG, R.I.: Failed states in a world of terror. *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 81. No. 4. 2002, 127-141.



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as the most fragile there are reservoirs and exporters of terror.<sup>30</sup> For sure, states without a centralized government may become anarchic areas where terrorist groups can freely build safe havens and find resources. Stewart Patrick stated: 'Weak states have at times provided transnational terrorist organizations with multiple benefits, by offering safe havens and ungoverned spaces; sources of ideological support; bases for training and indoctrination; access to weapons, conflict experience, financial resources, pools of recruits; staging grounds, transit zones, and targets of attack.'<sup>31</sup>

Part of the FSI data confirms these conclusions. In Somalia (1<sup>st</sup> position in the FSI) there is Al-Shabaab, a Salafist jihadist fundamentalist, clan-based insurgent group based in the Horn of Africa, also active in Kenya. The Central African Republic (3<sup>rd</sup> position) is one of the training bases of LRA. The activities of the insurgency groups in the DRC (8<sup>th</sup> position) and Nigeria (13<sup>th</sup> position) were described before. Taking all these facts into consideration, we can agree with the former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice who said: 'weak and failing states (...) serve as global pathways that facilitate (...) the movement of criminals and terrorists.'<sup>32</sup>

Although it is worth to add that in the report "Fragile States Index 2016", the problem of terrorism appears only on the margin of the main narrative. We can read: '[An] example of destabilizing cross-border effects can be seen clearly in the West African powerhouse nation, Nigeria. Beset by a tumultuous electoral campaign in 2015 that saw the administration of Goodluck Jonathan unseated by the return to power of Muhammadu Buhari, Nigeria's standing in the Fragile States Index has worsened, as the economy is deeply impacted by falling oil prices and the north of the country is terrorized by Boko Haram insurgency.'<sup>33</sup>

### Summary

According to many commentators, from their respective establishments, the authors of the FSI and the CNIC have been putting increasing emphasis on how states should operate, rather than on the causes of states failure. Sceptics accused them of excessive universalism, paternalism, or Westernism, and argue that the concept of vulnerable states has become a tool in the creation of post-imperial U.S. policy. Some of them may be referring to Noam Chomsky, who pointed out that the American classification of the states as areas of increased security risk, is in fact a manipulation, and leads to the abuse of international law. He wrote: 'The category of »failed states« was invoked repeatedly in the course of the »normative revolution« proclaimed in the self-designated »enlightened states« in the 1990s, entitling them to resort to force with the alleged goal of protecting the populations of (carefully selected) states in a manner that may be »illegal but legitimate«. As the leading themes of political discourse shifted from »humanitarian intervention« to the re-declared »war on terror« after 9/11, the concept »failed states« was given a broader scope to include states like Iraq that allegedly threaten the United States with weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism. (...) Under this broader usage, »failed states« need not be weak. (...) The concept must surely also cover »outlaw states« that dismiss with contempt the rules of international order and its institutions, carefully constructed over many years, overwhelmingly under US initiative. The familiar difficulties again arise: the category covers too broad a range to be doctrinally acceptable. The world dominant power is consciously

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<sup>30</sup> KRAXBERGER, B.M.: Failed States: Temporary Obstacles to Democratic Diffusion or Fundamental Holes in the World Political Map? *Third World Quarterly* Vol. 28. No. 6. 2007, 1055.

<sup>31</sup> PATRICK, S.: "Failed" States and Global Security: Empirical Questions and Policy Dilemmas. *International Studies Review* Vol. 9. No. 4. 2007, 652.

<sup>32</sup> SIMONS, A. – TUCKER, D.: The Misleading Problem of Failed States: A 'Socio-Geography' of Terrorism in the Post-9/11 Era. *Third World Quarterly* Vol. 28. No. 2. 2007, 387.

<sup>33</sup> *Fragile States Index 2016*. MESSNER, J. J. (ed.). The Fund for Peace, Washington, 2016. 16.





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choosing policies that typify outlaw states, that severely endanger the domestic population and that undermine substantive democracy.<sup>34</sup>

Proving the strength or weakness of a state has often been used to justify American war on terror at the periphery of the world. As Radosław Rybkowski writes: '[...] the question – who needs failed states? – must lead to a surprising answer in the modern world. There are many groups to which failed states, both as a phenomenon and concept, are very useful. The concept of failed states, becoming part of the discourse, convinces people of the rightness of political decisions in developed countries. It also contributes to the generous support of non-governmental organisations' activities by private persons. [...] [The notion of failed states] is useful for too many institutions and people in achieving their own goals – including the scientists, who can thus describe the subject of their research.'<sup>35</sup>

Based on the foregoing arguments, the preliminary hypothesis of this analysis which assumed that there is correlation between the degrees of disintegration and dysfunctionality of the state, and the activity of terrorist organizations has partly been confirmed. Contrary to a commonly held view, prime international terrorists do not come from failed states. Nor do failed states house many organizations that support terrorism. We should agree with Stewart Patrick who said: 'Just as Cold War security concerns led the United States and allied governments to promote strongman rule in the periphery, today's 'global war on terrorism' may encourage a shallow approach to state-building by sustaining regimes that promise order and stability rather than supporting the slow painstaking work of creating legitimate, participatory institutions of governance capable of delivering a broader panoply of socioeconomic goods as human security for their populations.'<sup>36</sup>

The second hypothesis (i.e. for countries with high scores in the CINC, terrorism appears as an external problem, and for countries at the top of the FSI, terrorism is an internal challenge) has been falsified. The position in the CINC ranking is simply not correlated with the level of internal security. CINC, as it was suggested, can be used to select countries that are responsible for providing security on the local level and to participate in the global war on terror and to test the fighting capability of the countries which became targets of terrorist attacks. The FSI seems to be a more valuable measure of the relation between states' vulnerability and the emergence of terrorism in Africa with some restrictions, but the connection with transnational terrorism is more complicated. In fact, terrorists are likely to find weak but functioning states for their bases of operation.

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<sup>34</sup> CHOMSKY 2006, 109-110.

<sup>35</sup> RYBKOWSKI, R.: Komu potrzebne są państwa upadłe? In KŁOSOWICZ, R. – MANIA, A. (eds.): *Problem upadku państw w stosunkach międzynarodowych*. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków, 2012, 21–22.

<sup>36</sup> PATRICK 2007, 648.



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	2017	2016	2015	2014	2013	2012	2011	2010	2009	2008
1	South Sudan	Somalia	South Sudan	South Sudan	Somalia	Somalia	Somalia	Somalia	Somalia	Somalia
2	Somalia	South Sudan	Somalia	Somalia	DRC	DRC	Chad	Chad	Zimbabwe	Sudan
3	CAR	CAR	CAR	CAR	Sudan	Sudan	Sudan	Sudan	Sudan	Zimbabwe
4	Yemen	Sudan	Sudan	DRC	South Sudan <sup>37</sup>	South Sudan	DRC	Zimbabwe	Chad	Chad
5	Sudan / Syria	Yemen	DRC	Sudan	Chad	Chad	Haiti	DRC	DRC	Iraq
6		Syria	Chad	Chad	Yemen	Zimbabwe	Zimbabwe	Afghanistan	Iraq	DRC
7	DRC	Chad	Yemen	Afghanistan	Afghanistan	Afghanistan	Afghanistan	Iraq	Afghanistan	Afghanistan
8	Chad	DRC	Syria	Yemen	Haiti	Haiti	CAR	CAR	CAR	Cote d'Ivoire
9	Afghanistan	Afghanistan	Afghanistan	Haiti	CAR	Yemen	Iraq	Guinea	Guinea	Pakistan
10	Iraq	Haiti	Guinea	Pakistan	Zimbabwe	Iraq	Cote d'Ivoire	Pakistan	Pakistan	CAR
11	Haiti	Iraq	Haiti	Zimbabwe	Iraq	CAR	Guinea	Haiti	Cote d'Ivoire	Guinea
12	Guinea	Guinea	Iraq	Guinea	Cote d'Ivoire	Cote d'Ivoire	Pakistan	Cote d'Ivoire	Haiti	Bangladesh / Myanmar
13	Nigeria / Zimbabwe	Nigeria	Pakistan	Iraq	Pakistan	Guinea	Yemen	Kenya	Myanmar	
14		Pakistan	Nigeria	Cote d'Ivoire	Guinea	Pakistan	Nigeria	Nigeria	Kenya	Haiti
15	Ethiopia	Burundi	Cote d'Ivoire	Syria	Guinea Bissau	Nigeria	Niger	Yemen	Nigeria	North Korea
16	Guinea Bissau	Zimbabwe	Zimbabwe	Guinea Bissau	Nigeria	Guinea Bissau	Kenya	Myanmar	Ethiopia	Uganda / Ethiopia
17	Burundi / Pakistan	Guinea Bissau	Guinea Bissau	Nigeria	Kenya	Kenya	Burundi	Ethiopia	North Korea	

<sup>37</sup> Though South Sudan was included for the first time as the 178<sup>th</sup> country within the Index, it did not receive a formal rank for the 2012 Index, as the data available since independence did not constitute a full year and thus could not be accurately compared to the other 177 countries.



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18		Eritrea	Burundi	Kenya	Niger	Ethiopia	Guinea Bissau / Myanmar	Timor-Leste	Yemen	Nigeria / Lebanon
19	Eritrea	Niger	Niger	Ethiopia / Niger	Ethiopia	Burundi / Niger	Ethiopia	North Korea / Niger	Bangladesh	Sri Lanka
20	Niger	Kenya	Ethiopia		Burundi			Uganda	Uganda	
21	Cote d'Ivoire	Cote d'Ivoire	Kenya / Liberia	Burundi	Syria	Uganda	Uganda	Uganda	Uganda	Yemen
22	Kenya	Cameroon		Uganda	Uganda	Myanmar	North Korea	Guinea Bissau	Sri Lanka	Niger
23	Libya	Uganda	Uganda	Eritrea	North Korea / Liberia	North Korea	Timor-Leste	Burundi	Niger	Nepal
24	Uganda	Ethiopia	Eritrea				Liberia / Myanmar	Eritrea / Syria	Cameroon	Bangladesh
25	Myanmar	Libya	Libya	North Korea	Myanmar	Liberia			Liberia	Nepal / Cameroon
26	Cameroon	Myanmar	Mauritania	Cameroon	Cameroon	Cameroon	Nepal	Guinea Bissau		
27	Liberia	Liberia	Myanmar	Cameroon	Cameroon	Cameroon	Nepal	Malawi / Sierra Leone	Malawi	
28	Mauritania	Mauritania	Cameroon	Mauritania	Sri Lanka	Nepal	Eritrea	Sierra Leone	Lebanon	Malawi
29	Congo Republic	Mali	North Korea	Bangladesh	Bangladesh	Timor-Leste	Sri Lanka		Eritrea	Congo
30	North Koreac	North Korea	Mali	Sri Lanka	Nepal	Bangladesh / Sri Lanka	Sierra Leone	Eritrea	Congo	Solomon Islands

Table 4: Fragile / Failed States Index, data 2007-2017. (Source: The author's elaboration based on the annual FSI reports. Available at: <http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/>, retrieved on 10 09 2017)



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Edited by:  
Tamás Csiki Varga

Contact:

1581 Budapest, P.O. Box. 15.

Phone: 00 36 1 432-90-92

E-mail: [svkk@uni-nke.hu](mailto:svkk@uni-nke.hu)

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